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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to gain a greater understanding of how various 
incentives, both non-monetary and monetary, can impact recruiter productivity. Towards 
this end, I developed and administered a survey that was applied to most NRDs and 
elicited preferences for various monetary and non-monetary incentive schemes. One key 
result is that enlisted production recruiters tend not to value non-monetary awards, while 
management believes that these awards are important motivators. The other key result is 
that a modest bonus per high-quality contract (of $50 or $100), along with eliminating 
demand constraints, would significantly increase productivity.  
Based on conservative assumptions, I find that a $100 bonus per high-quality 
contract would allow for a reduction of over 600 recruiters and potentially have a 32-to-1 
benefit-cost ratio. In light of potential problems of using bonuses, other results suggest 
that giving a half-day of liberty per HQ contract would also elicit significantly higher 
productivity, notably with no increase in costs. 
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The allure of accelerated advancement opportunities and the supplemental special 
duty assignment pay (SDAP) of $450 per month may encourage sailors to volunteer for 
recruiting duty. However, these incentives lack the endurance to successively motivate 
recruiters. Samuelson et al.’s (2006) inverted-U productivity curve appropriately 
illustrates this absence of incentive resilience, indicating that recruiters achieve their peak 
productivity between 12 and 18 months (Samuelson, Kraus, Reese, & Moskowitz, 2006). 
The drop-off in productivity after their peak (with usually more than half of their tour 
remaining) suggests that recruiters underperform.  
Along these lines, for nearly 25 years, recruiter productivity has steadily 
decreased. Research suggests that fluctuations in the number of recruiters, and the 
distribution of recruiter experience, influence this decay of productivity (Samuelson et 
al., 2006). Although the size of force and distribution of experience may affect 
productivity, Samuelson et al.’s recommendation to address decreased productivity 
discounts the influence of appropriate incentives on recruiter productivity.  
For some recruiters, the monthly quota system offers the necessary incentive to be 
more productive; however, this system may encourage unsolicited recruiter behavior. For 
example, new research found that recruiters may purposely retain prospective recruits 
until the following month (Arkes and Cunha, 2014). In doing so, recruiters meet their 
minimum requirement early in the month, usually within the first week; thereby easing 
the stress of producing an implied productivity of one contract per month. This practice is 
commonly referred to as “sand bagging” a recruit, which refers to a recruiter deliberately 
underwriting contracts to save a recruit for the following month. The implications of this 
practice can include deterioration of Navy recruiting station (NRS) cohesion and NRS 
missing monthly mission goals. Furthermore, their findings suggest inadequate incentives 
promote mediocrity and risk forgoing quality for quantity.  
Regarding recruit “sand bagging,” additional research by Arkes shows evidence 
that recruiters are not as productive as they could be after their first monthly contract 
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(Arkes, 2013). Therefore, the monthly quota system may require additional incentives to 
curtail this period of inefficient performance, and a self-supported monthly bonus may 
achieve the desired recruiter behavior.  
This thesis conducts a survey to determine the importance of various incentives 
and to quantify the potential effectiveness of a bonus. In particular, the survey will ask 
participants to express their level of satisfaction with the current non-monetary 
incentives, and will also provide scenario-based questions to elicit recruiter preferences 
and potential recruiter productivity under different bonus scenarios. This will assist in 
determining which incentives, monetary and/or non-monetary, encourage recruiter 
productivity. The survey will likely identify individual-level attitudes and perceptions 
that affect their productivity; thereby assisting in the development of future incentive 
policies 
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II. NAVY RECRUITING 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of conscription in 1973, successful execution of the Navy’s strategy 
has relied upon volunteers to source its manning requirements. Today’s Navy requires the 
enlistment of approximately 36,000 civilians annually; to meet this requirement the Navy 
depends upon its recruiting force within Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). 
Over the past two decades, NRC has experienced a steady decrease in 
productivity per recruiter (PPR). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the average FY PPR and 
groups the data into three categories: DOD drawdown, Sustainment, and Navy 
drawdown. These categories reflect DOD strategic priorities, which may have affected 
PPR. However, this decline may also indicate that recruiters may not be as productive as 
they once were. 
 
 
Figure 1. Official contracts per recruiter. (after Samuelson, Kraus, Reese, 




Historically, NRC has maintained an average recruiting force of 3800 recruiters to 
complete its mission. Data provided by NRC (R. Jenkins, personal communication, 
February 14, 2014) illustrates the relationship between the number of recruiters and 
monthly PPR (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. PPR versus number of recruiters 
As seen in Figure 2, the number of recruiters versus PPR shows an inverse 
relationship. For example, in FY 99 through FY01 the number of recruiters increased as 
the average PPR decreased. Furthermore, in FY09 through FY13 the numbers of 
recruiters decreased as the average PPR increased. When comparing Figure 1 and Figure 
2, there are slight difference in PPR (due to the data coming from different sources); 
however they both illustrate a similar decline in PPR.  
In the next section, I will describe the infrastructure required to accomplish the 
mission of Navy recruiting. 
B. NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND  
1. Mission 
According to Commander, Navy Recruiting Command: 
Navy Recruiting Command is charged to seek out, source and recruit the 
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of ready personnel. This state of readiness is achieved through: strong 
integrity-based leadership, spirited teamwork, and a commitment to 
excellence. Navy Recruiting Command is ready to responsibly employ its 
assets to provide its recruiting field all the necessary resources to deliver 
the highest quality Sailors to the fleet, and it has a professional and moral 
obligation to uphold our covenant with our recruiting force—military and 
civilian—and our Future Sailors. (Commander, Navy Recruiting 
Command [CNRC], 2013) 
2. Command Structure 
The structure of Navy Recruiting Command consists of the following five 
components:   
a. Navy Recruiting Command 
As the headquarters, Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) provides strategic 
oversight for Navy recruiting. Working hand-in-hand with the Chief of Naval Personnel 
(CNP), NRC receives future personnel requirements. In doing so, NRC then establishes 
policy guidelines and incentive programs that encourage efficient and ethical recruiting 
practices to achieve requirements. 
b. Navy Recruiting Region  
Located within NRC headquarters, in Millington, Tennessee, region commanders 
divide the nation into two regions, Region East and Region West. As seen in Figure 3, 
Region East is located to the right of the red line; the opposite is true for Region West. 
Each region is comprised of 13 districts, which includes the following overseas locations: 
Europe, Guam, Japan, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  
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Figure 3. Regions and district map (from CNRC, 2013) 
c. Navy Recruiting District  
To ensure national recruiting coverage, 26 Navy recruiting districts (NRDs) are 
strategically placed throughout the nation (see Figure 3). As a result, NRDs are 
responsible to efficiently canvas their assigned area of responsibility (AOR) to ensure all 
eligible candidates are given an opportunity to serve. 
d. Navy Recruiting District Division 
Each NRD geographic AOR is further subdivided into divisions. Depending on 
the geographic area of a NRD, an NRD may consist of six to 10 divisions. 
e. Navy Recruiting Station  
Currently, 985 Navy recruiting stations (NRS) are spread out among the 26 
NRDs. Ideally, an NRS should be placed in a geographic location with a high propensity 
for enlistment. NRS locations are identified and organized by zip code through 
demographic and past production data, and all zip codes within the NRD must be 
assigned to a NRS regardless of population density. 
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C. PERSONNEL 
1. Canvasser Recruiters 
Typically, a canvasser recruiter is a sailor returning from the fleet executing their 
rotational shore-duty. Additionally, these recruiters often have five to 10 years of 
experience in the Navy and normally volunteer for recruiting duty to advance their 
careers. 
2. Career Recruiting Force Recruiters 
Career recruiting force (CRF) recruiters are recognized as subject matter experts 
in the field of recruiting. In general, CRF recruiters were sailors who excelled in 
recruiting during their initial tour and submitted a package requesting to convert their rate 
to Navy counselor recruiting (NCR). By retaining successful recruiters as NCRs, NRC 
preserves requisite knowledge to successfully train future canvasser recruiters. 
D. DAILY RECRUITER TASKS 
A systematic recruiting process provides a framework in which the recruiter is to 
operate, and is critical to a successful tour of duty. An overview of daily recruiter 
activities are as follows: 
1. Market Identification  
If a recruiter fails to plan, they plan to fail. Identifying a market with a high 
propensity to enlist is the cornerstone to recruiter productivity. Once a recruiter identifies 
this market, they can develop a plan of action and determine the most effective mode of 
prospecting to penetrate the market. 
2. Prospecting  
Modes of prospecting include the following: phone, finding personally developed 
contacts, establishing center of influences (i.e., teachers, coaches, and counselors), 
contacting leads, and referrals. Prospecting serves as a way to arrange and conduct an 
interview with the prospect. 
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3. Screening 
Normally conducted in conjunction with prospecting, the screening process 
allows recruiters to gather prospect information such as medical history, drug usage, 
criminal background, citizenship, age, height, and weight to determine their enlistment 
eligibility status. This process allows recruiters to quickly eliminate unqualified prospects 
and avoid the misuse of time. 
4. Presentation of Opportunities 
During a face-to-face interview with a potential applicant and their significant 
others or parents, recruiters answer questions regarding the Navy and present 
opportunities available in the Navy. Additionally, each recruiter is trained to identify the 
needs of each prospect, as well as a significant other’s or a parent’s needs, in order to 
have them submit an application for enlistment. 
5. Processing  
Once an applicant is determined to be conditionally enlistment eligible, the 
applicant applying for enlistment in the USN or USNR must complete the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and a physical examination at the 
processing station by a military entrance processing station (MEPS) representative. This 
process requires the recruiter to prepare and submit all necessary paperwork, for each 
applicant, prior to scheduling the aforementioned enlistment requirements. 
6. Enlistment 
Once considered fully eligible for enlistment, an acceptable ASVAB score and 
physical examination, the applicant selects their future job and enlists into the Delayed 
Entry Program (DEP). Since the enlistment process is normally conducted at MEPS, the 
recruiter may be required to provide the new enlistee, now entitled a DEPer, 
transportation to return to the NRS. 
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7. Delayed Entry Program  
Management of the DEP pool involves the recruiter preparing their DEPers for 
Recruit Training Command (RTC), as well as maintaining their DEPers enlistment 
eligibility status. Recruiters will manage DEPers for up to 12 months. Benefits of the 
DEP program include advancement opportunities for DEPers, prior to departing to RTC, 
and production of DEP referrals. 
8. Shipping 
Lastly, recruiters are responsible to ensure that each DEPer ships to RTC. In 
preparation of this evolution, recruiters must transport the DEPer to MEPS on their 
scheduled shipping date.  
Due to the demanding environment of recruiting duty, recruiters must 
systematically integrate responsibilities and activities to successfully accomplish their 
mission. More importantly, they must understand the process and continually evaluate 
and improve their time management skills.  
E. GOALING 
Reasonable assignment of goals to each NRD, division, and NRS, is the objective 
of the goal allocation process. This necessitates an in-depth analysis of market and 
assignment of recruiters in such a way that each recruiter has the same opportunity to 
make goal. The recruiting regional commander issues an annual goaling letter to each 
NRD to establish formal accountability, by division, for goal attainment. The NRD 
assesses the makeup of its market and evenly distributes its goal to each division leading 
chief petty officer (DLCPO), who then finally distributes the goal to the each NRS 
leading chief petty officer (LCPO) or leading petty officer (LPO). 
Standardized Territory Evaluation and Analysis for Management (STEAM) 
applies algorithms to national market data to assist recruiting region commanders and 
NRDs in assigning monthly recruiting goals. Additionally, STEAM provides an 
analytical process by which recruiting region commanders and NRDs can perform market 
research activities to assign recruiting goals (CNRC, 2011). 
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Each month, using STEAM information, NRC distributes a “goaling letter” to 
each NRD that specifies individual recruiting benchmarks based on the NRD’s market 
share. Upon receipt, the NRD determines the market share for each division and NRS 
using the measures that best identify potential recruiter productivity. STEAM allows the 
NRD flexibility in identifying these factors. However, market share calculations are most 
impacted by a combination of population and production factors. The market share for 
each NRS is a fraction that indicates the share of the NRD market of selected data 
elements (or potential market) contained in the zip codes assigned to that station. Market 
shares may be calculated with various weights and other combinations of data elements 
for comparison and to target other markets (CNRC, 2011). 
F. CURRENT INCENTIVES 
Although seldom discussed, receipt of recruiter special duty assignment pay 
(SDAP), $450 per month, implies that the recruiter is expected to write at least one net 
contract per month. Once a recruiter qualifies to receive SDAP, their eligibility status is 
updated monthly by headquarters personnel. If a recruiter has not met monthly eligibility 
requirements they risk being removed from the command’s authorized SDAP manifest.  
Therefore, in some ways, fear of missing this requirement acts as a productivity 
incentive. Despite this fear, those who volunteer for recruiting duty understand that a 
successful tour increases their advancement opportunities. 
To optimize recruiter productivity, Navy policy should contain incentives that 
capture desired recruiter behavior. Current policy provides a singular monetary incentive, 
SDAP, and several non-monetary incentives that will be discussed.  
1. Special Duty Assignment Pay  
According to Navy Personnel Command:  
The SDAP [Special Duty Assignment Pay] program is an incentive pay 
ranging from $75 to $450 a month used to entice qualified Sailors to serve 
in designated billets that are considered extremely difficult or entail 
arduous duty. Program levels change to reflect the current environment 
associated with each billet and to sustain adequate manning levels. In 
order to qualify for SDAP, Sailors must be assigned to and working in a 
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valid billet on the Command Manpower Authorization Listing. This billet 
must be authorized by the Bureau of Naval Personnel as a special duty 
assignment billet. Commands holding SDAP billets are required to 
complete an annual recertification. (Navy Personnel Command [NPC], 
2011) 
2. Non-monetary Incentives 
Non-monetary incentives serve to promote recruiter productivity through 
recognition. Receipt of certain non-monetary incentives such as the Navy commendation 
medal, the Navy and Marine Corps achievement medal, and a flag letter of 
commendation recognize the individual’s effort, but more importantly, they increase the 
recruiter’s advancement opportunities. 
G. HISTORY OF RECRUITER BONUSES 
Historically bonuses have not been utilized to incentivize recruiter productivity in 
any service. However, during the mid-2000s, the Army implemented the recruiter 
incentive pay (RIP) pilot program to offer bonuses for individual recruiter productivity. 
The program’s intent was to boost the Army’s percentage of high school graduates and 
improve its enlisted ASVAB scores (Farrell, 2008). Due to suspected fraud, the program 
was terminated in February 2012 and a federal investigation was initiated to determine 








This chapter discusses my approach to answering the following questions: 
 Does the current awards system adequately incentivize recruiters? 
 What effects do monetary and non-monetary incentives have on recruiter 
productivity?  
 Would a bonus per net high-quality contract increase productivity enough 
to pay for itself? 
 What effect does liberty have on productivity? 
The primary goal of this survey is to have recruiters reveal their expected 
productivity by answering scenario-based questions; then compare their scenario 
responses to their non-monetary productivity estimates. This will assist in determining 
which incentives optimize recruiter productivity. 
B. SURVEY 
I conducted an online-survey, using Lime Survey software, to elicit recruiter 
preferences and observe their behavior under different scenarios. The survey was 
administered to 20 of 26 NRDs, which represents 76.9 percent of all NRDs. Data 
received from NRC (R. Jenkins, personal communication, February 14, 2014) suggests 
the average number of recruiters, at any given time, is 3,250. Assuming recruiters are 
evenly distributed among NRDs, the sample size is approximately 2,500 recruiters (3,250 
average number of recruiters times 76.9 volunteer percentage). A total of 794 participants 
completed the survey; of which 306 enlisted recruiters, the targeted population, 
completed the survey, a response rate of approximately 12 percent. Additionally, 488 
responses were officer recruiters, LPOs, LCPOs, DLCPOs, and headquarters 
management, and, when aggregated with enlisted recruiters, accounts for approximately 
30 percent survey response rate. The survey consists of 34 questions divided into five 
sections: general information, non-monetary awards, a bonus scenario, estimated 
productivity, and current SDAP structure. Additionally, at the end of the survey, 
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participants could leave comments making contributions to the research. Next, I will 
describe the logic used to develop each section of the survey. 
1. Section I (General Information) 
Asking general questions will allow me to create anonymous individual profiles 
and compare their perspectives on current recruiter incentives. Through these profiles, I 
can identify whether an incentive disconnect— the difference between perspectives on 
incentives that motivate recruiters— exists between recruiters and their leadership. 
Section one consists of the following questions: 
a. Which Category Best Describes Your Current Position? 
The participants were given the following choices: enlisted recruiter (ER), officer 
recruiter (OR), leading petty officer (LPO), leading chief petty officer (LCPO), division 
leading chief petty officer (DLCPO), headquarters management (HQ), and none of the 
above. Based on the participant’s selection, subsequent questions will be relevant to their 
position; thereby minimizing the survey’s duration and impact on recruiter productivity.  
b. Which of the Following Best Describes Your Current Recruiter 
Qualification? 
Only those who selected ER, LPO, and LCPO on the previous question were 
asked about their qualification and were able to select the following as their current 
recruiter qualification: unqualified, basic, or advance. Since these three positions are 
considered to be “on-production,”—meaning those making initial contact with an 
applicant and assisting them through the enlistment process—their current qualification 
may reveal their perspective on recruiter productivity. For example, once recruiters arrive 
to their assigned Navy recruiting station (NRS) they are given 90 days to become “basic” 
recruiter qualified. Other than the 90 days given, an incentive to become basic recruiter 
qualified is on-production recruiters only receive their SDAP, $450 per month, once they 
receive this qualification.  
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c. Did You Volunteer for Recruiting Duty? 
The participant is given the option to select “yes” or “no.” This question may 
reveal the recruiter’s outlook on recruiting incentives. For example, if a recruiter did not 
volunteer for recruiting duty and has been unsuccessful in recruiting, there may be no 
incentives that motivate them to maximize their productivity.  
d. Were You Given a Choice About Where You Would be Stationed? 
Recruiting duty offers a unique opportunity for sailors to return to their hometown 
and recruit the next generation of sailors by sharing their experiences. The participant is 
given the option to select “yes” or “no.” This question may reveal a non-monetary 
incentive, hometown recruiting, which motivates recruiter productivity. 
e. How Many Months Have You Been on Recruiting Duty? 
This question provides an opportunity to observe whether recruiter qualifications 
and productivity correlated. For example, are basic recruiters less productive than 
advanced recruiters, or vice versa? 
f. What is Your Best Guess for How Many Contracts You Have Written in 
the Last [3, 6, 12] Months? 
By asking this question, recruiters provide a baseline of their productivity. At this 
point recruiters do not have an incentive to game the survey.  
g. Assuming Your Production was Limited by Navy Recruiting Command 
Quality Standards, How Many Contracts Could You Have Written in the 
Last [3,6,12] if You Were NOT Restricted in How Many Contracts You 
Could Have Written? 
The participant does not see this question unless the previous question’s answer is 
greater than zero contracts. The purpose of this question is to address the potentially 
adverse effect of limiting a recruiter’s production. This limitation may act as a 
disincentive to productivity. 
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h. Approximately, What Percentage of Your Contracts Have Been High-
Quality (AFQT>=50)? 
This question indicates the recruiter’s ability to write high-quality contracts. For 
example, if the recruiter indicates that 89 percent of their contracts have been high-
quality, then it is safe to assume that the recruiter has the ability to write these contracts 
despite the current incentive. Therefore, when given a bonus scenario, which requires the 
recruiter to write a high-quality contract, the incentive will remain attainable. 
i. Are You a Career Recruiter? 
This question allows me to observe whether incentives motivate the two types of 
recruiters, canvasser and career, differently.  
2. Section II (Non-monetary Awards) 
This section provides survey participants an opportunity to express their opinion 
on how nonmonetary incentives affect recruiter productivity. Although incentives may 
vary among NRDs, the following categories capture individual recruiter incentives, 
described below, used among all NRDs: gold wreath, other individual-level awards, and 
liberty. By asking the participant to rank each category, I will be able to determine which 
nonmonetary incentive has the largest impact on recruiter productivity. 
a. Gold Wreath  
Upon successful completion of Navy Orientation Recruiting Unit (NORU), 
recruiters are awarded a recruiting badge that is prominently displayed on the recruiter’s 
uniform. This badge is unique and is only authorized to be worn while on recruiting duty. 
Moreover, the aesthetics of the recruiter badge can be enhanced through recruiter 
productivity. To illustrate, an enlisted recruiter will receive gold wreath awards once they 
have been onboard at least 90 days and net any combination of four new contracts/reserve 
gains within a consecutive, non-overlapping, three month period or less (CNRC, 2013). 
Many recruiters recognize the initial gold wreath as a recruiting milestone, which 
indicates the recruiter’s professional knowledge and competency, and subsequent 
awarded gold wreaths further support this recognition.  
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b. Other Individual Awards  
The NRC Awards Manual, COMNAVCRUITCOM 1650.1B Chapter 5, provides 
NRD leadership guidance in managing and submitting recruiter awards. Perhaps due to 
the interpretation of the manual, presentation of awards vary among NRDs. As a result, 
we grouped enlisted recruiter awards, not including gold wreaths, into other individual 
awards (OIA). These awards include the following: Navy commendation medal, Navy 
and Marine Corps achievement medal, recruiter of the year, recruiter of the quarter, 
recruiter of the month, heavy-hitter, and the six-shooter award. The purpose of each 
award is to promote recruiter productivity through recognition; however, when compared 
to other OIA awards, two awards distinctively activate increased productivity, the Navy 
Unlike other OIA, these awards directly impact the recruiter’s future advancement 
opportunities.  
c. Liberty 
Time off tends to be the most effective means of boosting recruiter productivity. 
Frontline leadership such as LPOs, LCPOs, and DLCPOs, when able, take advantage of 
this favorable incentive; however, they have limited authorization. For example, frontline 
leadership is only authorized to grant a maximum of 24 hours liberty, which means that 
leadership is unable to grant liberty on Mondays or Fridays. As a result, this limitation 
does not provide leadership sufficient autonomy to maximize the benefits of liberty, such 
as high morale and job satisfaction.  
Section II consists of the following questions: 
d. How Often do the Following Awards Motivate Recruiters to Obtain 
More Than One Contract Per Month? 
This question will reveal which nonmonetary award(s) motivates recruiters to 
write more than one high-quality contract per month. Using a Likert-scale, each 
participant can express their level of agreement by selecting the following: strongly 
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree. If the participant selects “strongly 
disagree,” their opinion to the corresponding award indicates that the award has little  
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effect on their productivity. Conversely, if they select “strongly agree,” the corresponding 
award significantly contributes to their motivation in attaining an additional high-quality 
contract. 
e. How Often do The Following Awards Cause Recruiters to Shift Their 
Efforts From Recruiting High-Quality (AFQT>=50) to Low-Quality 
(AFQT<50) Recruits? 
This question seeks to reveal whether recruiters shift their efforts based on the 
numbers of days left in the month. 
3. Section III (Bonus Scenario) 
Recruiters may have a tendency to exaggerate their productivity if simply asked 
how productive they would be in certain situations. Therefore, to foster an authentic 
response, recruiters faced the potential to lose money as a means to accurately indicate 
productivity. 
In this section, recruiters are placed into a scenario in which they are given a one-
time option to select one of the following SDAP options:  
 Plan A—receive the current recruiter SDAP of $450 per month; or  
 Plan B—receive an SDAP pay of $250 a month plus a certain bonus per 
net high-quality contract.  
The purpose of this scenario is to reveal estimated output and the influence of 
monetary incentives on recruiter productivity. Note, SDAP reduction to $250 would not 
be necessary if a bonus were to be implemented.  
The section’s initial question asks the recruiter to make a one-time selection of 
their preferred SDAP option, Plan A or Plan B, if the bonus amount were $50 per net 
high-quality contract. If the recruiter selects Plan B, I can infer that the recruiter estimates 
a monthly output of four or more high-quality contracts. Conversely, if the recruiter 
initially selects Plan A, I can infer that the recruiter’s estimated monthly output will be 
less than four net high-quality contracts per month or they are opposed to recruiter 
bonuses. . In the event the recruiter initially selects Plan A, the survey will ask a follow-
up question that increases the initial bonus amount by $50, for a total of $100 per net 
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high-quality contract. Once again, the recruiter will have the option to either remain on 
the current recruiter SDAP, or switch to Plan B. The survey logic will persist if the 
recruiter continues to select Plan A, and it will stop once the recruiter rejects a bonus 
amount of $300 per net high-quality contract. Once the recruiter rejects the $300 bonus, 
the following question asks the recruiter to submit the bonus amount in which they would 
select Plan B. In doing so, the recruiter reveals their estimated output. Using rational 




(monthly net HQ 
contracts) 
$50 At least 4.00 
$100 At least 2.00 
$150 At least1.33 
$200 At least 1.00 
$250 At least 0.80 
$300 At least 0.67 
Table 1.   Implied recruiter productivity 
4. Section IV (Projected Productivity) 
In this section, recruiters no longer have the option to remain on the current 
SDAP, $450 per month. Rather, recruiters are given a scenario in which NRC has 
implemented a new SDAP, $250 per month plus a certain bonus for each net high-quality 
contract, designed to increase recruiter productivity and decrease the cost of ineffective 
recruiters. Unlike Section III, this section directly solicits the recruiter to provide their 
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estimated output for a given bonus amount. The bonus amounts were: zero dollars (no 
bonus), $100, $150, $200, $250, $300, $500, and $1000.  
a. Section Update 
In my initial version of the survey, this section asked the recruiter to estimate their 
output solely based on a monetary incentive. After receiving feedback from participants, I 
sensed many recruiters would rather have time off than a bonus Therefore, I added two 
additional questions that asked recruiters to estimate their productivity if they were given 
two options: 1) half-day liberty for each net high-quality contract; or 2) full day liberty 
for each net high-quality contract. Most of the time recruiters are given time off during 
weekends, so to make these two options a true incentive I indicated that the days off work 
were to be taken between Monday and Friday, at their discretion. This update allows me 
to observe the effects of offering recruiters time off after meeting their monthly 
requirements. 
5. Section V (Current SDAP Structure)  
This section seeks to reveal whether the current SDAP provides a sense of output 
equity among recruiters. 
The first question asks: considering the environment of recruiting duty, the 
Current SDAP 1) under compensates 2) correctly compensates 3) over compensates, 
recruiters. This question provides an opportunity for participants to express their level of 
satisfaction with the current SDAP. Moreover, responses may support policy 
recommendations for restructuring the current SDAP.  
Next, the following question was only asked to those participants who selected 
under compensate recruiters. Using a Likert scale, participants indicated whether a larger 
SDAP would motivate recruiters by selecting the following: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, or strongly agree. The results may indicate whether an incentive motivates 
recruiters to write one more contract, monetary or nonmonetary. 
The last question was asked to determine whether potential cost savings exist in 
paying recruiters according to their qualification, assuming the following: 
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 Total force of 3250 recruiters 
 One-third of the recruiting force is basic qualified (1,073 recruiters) 
 SDAP were reduced to $250 per month for basic qualified recruiters 
 Minimum time to qualify for advanced recruiter is 12 months 
The following equation reveals potential annual cost-savings: 
   monthsSDAPqualifiedBasicSavings 12**_   
    000,762,3$12*250$*254,1 Savings   
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY 
With a potential sample size of 3250 participants, after numerous attempts to 
contact each NRD, only 20 of 26 NRDs volunteered to participate in the survey. 
Additionally, of the 20 participating NRDs, only 306 enlisted recruiters completed the 










The objective of this research is to determine which incentives motivate recruiters 
to be more productive. By analyzing survey responses, we can quantify the effects of 
non-monetary and monetary incentives to determine which incentives recruiters respond 
to, and whether current NRC incentives promote recruiters to be more productive.  
B. NON-MONETARY ANALYSIS 
1. Recruiters 
Survey responses for non-monetary incentives were divided into three categories: 
Gold Wreath (GW), Other-individual awards (OIA), and Liberty. Participants, 306 
enlisted recruiters, were asked to describe how current non-monetary incentives affect 
their motivation to attain one more high-quality contract by choosing one of the 
following descriptors: never, rarely, sometimes, often, or always. Their opinions will 
allow me to identify and compare incentive effects (see Figure 4).  
 















Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always
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Figure 4 indicates, the GW “never” motivates 36 percent, “rarely” motivates 18.2 
percent, “sometimes” motivates 20.1 percent, “often” motivates 11.7 percent, and 
“always” motivates 14.0 percent of enlisted recruiters to attain one more high-quality 
contract. However, when making pair-wise comparisons, testing for the difference in 
means, amongst these categorical responses, only “never” and “always” are statistically 
significant at the fiver percent level. Several comments made by recruiters suggest that 
the GW may be more effective if it were awarded in a timely manner. To illustrate, many 
survey comments described an instance in which eligibility requirements for a GW were 
satisfied, but presentation of the award occurred several months later. This interval 
between eligibility and actual receipt of the award can work as a disincentive; therefore 
explaining why 36 percent of the participants were “never” motivated by the GW to 
attain one more additional high-quality contract. 
Responses to OIA appear to have an even distribution; however, almost 25 
percent of participants indicate the incentive “never” motivates them to attain an 
additional high-quality contract. However, when comparing “always” percentages 
between GW and OIA, 14 percent and 22.1 percent respectively, recruiters appear more 
likely to be motivated by OIA. 
A final look shows that “Liberty” leads as the most influential non-monetary 
incentive. With 38.3 percent indicating the incentive “always” motivates them to attain 
one more high-quality contract. This percentage may represent the fact that recruiters 
come to recruiting duty, technically a shore duty, expecting to have sufficient liberty to 
recover from sea duty. When compared to other non-monetary incentives, survey 
comments suggest that recruiters would be more productive if awarded liberty. 
2. Leadership 
In the same manner as recruiters, NRD leadership, 309 participants, were asked to 
describe how current non-monetary incentives affect recruiter motivation to attain one 
more high-quality contract. Figure 5 graphically illustrates their responses. 
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Figure 5. Effects of non-monetary incentives on recruiter productivity (leadership) 
Figure 5 indicates, leadership believes the Gold Wreath (GW) “never” motivates 
14.2 percent, “rarely” motivates 24.3 percent, “sometimes” motivates 30.1 percent, 
“often” motivates 11.7 percent, and “always” motivates 14.0 percent of enlisted recruiters 
to attain one more high-quality contract. What is interesting to note is that the shape of 
responses may indicate that leadership is undecided when determining the effects of the 
GW. 
With respect to OIA, Figure 5 shows leadership making a positive shift towards 
the incentives motivating recruiters to write one more high-quality contract. In supporting 
this claim, we examine the percentage change among “sometimes,” “often,” and 
“always.” With a decrease of 2.3 percent “sometimes” facilitates the growths of “often” 
and “always” by 12 and 9.1 percent, respectively.  
Finally, evidence shows that 38.2 percent, compared to OIA’s 18.5 percent, of 
leadership expects “Liberty” to motivate recruiters. This clear and conclusive evidence 
suggests that “Liberty” is the chief non-monetary incentive. 
3. Comparing Recruiter and Leadership Perceptions of Non-monetary 
Incentives 
To ensure recruiters are properly incentivized, leadership must understand what 
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in perception among recruiters and leadership. Two other categories, Station-level 
Awards and District-level Awards, were presented to participants; however, when testing 
for differences in responses, the differences were not statistically significant; the 
responses were not statistically significant; as a result the categories were not included in 
the graphs below. 
Starting with Figure 6, we observe the largest difference occurs with the GW 
incentive. The results indicate that 36 percent of recruiters are “never” motivated by the 
incentive; whereas 14.2 percent of leadership is confident that recruiters are “never” 
motivated by the GW. This difference is significant and, when compared to recruiters, 
leadership tends to under estimate motivation for each incentive. Moreover, we observe 
an exponential decay as the incentive approaches “Liberty.” 
 
Figure 6. “Never” comparison between recruiters and leadership 
Next in Figure 7, negligible differences occur in incentive motivation. However, 




















Figure 7. “Rarely” comparison between recruiters and leadership 
Figure 8 illustrates that leadership overestimates the GW and OIA by 10 percent 
and 9.7 percent respectively, and is in alignment with recruiters regarding “Liberty.” 
 
Figure 8. “Sometimes” comparison between recruiters and leadership 
Figure 9 illustrates that leadership overestimates all category’s effect on recruiter 
motivation. However, in this figure, we observe the responses shifting from a downward 



































Figure 9. “Often” comparison between recruiters and leadership  
Finally, Figure 10 displays exponential growth as the incentive approaches 
“Liberty.” Moreover, Figure 10 shows the highest percentage alignment among recruiters 
and leadership. 
 
Figure 10. “Always” comparison between recruiters and leadership 
C. MONETARY INCENTIVES 
By providing a monetary incentive, I seek to understand the effect a bonus has on 


































productivity if simply asked how productive they would be in certain situations, so I 
elicited recruiter’s implied productivity based on their selected preferred plan.  
Currently, recruiting duty offers one monetary incentive, Special Duty 
Assignment Pay (SDAP), which is offered to encourage sailors to volunteer for recruiting 
duty. Once qualified, recruiters receive SDAP, $450 per month, in which expected 
productivity of one contract per month is implicit. However, in many instances, 
unproductive recruiters rarely have their SDAP suspended. Consequently, current SDAP 
policy does not allow us to observe the effect of monetary incentives on productivity. 
Therefore, through the use of scenarios, I will be able to observe the effects of monetary 
incentives would likely have on actual recruiter productivity.   
1. Recruiter Scenario 
In this scenario each recruiter must select one of the following SDAP plans:  
 Plan A: Receive current SDAP of $450 per month; or 
 Plan B: Receive a $250 SDAP plus a $50 bonus per net high-quality 
contract 
Selection of their preferred plan reveals their implied productivity per recruiter 
(PPR). For example, if the recruiter selects Plan B above, the expected minimum PPR 
would be four net high-quality contracts per month allowing them to return to $450 per 
month. Conversely, if the recruiter selects Plan A above, the expected minimum PPR 
would be less than four net high-quality contracts per month. In order to reveal the 
implied PPR for those selecting Plan A, the scenario is designed to ask subsequent 
questions consisting of the same options; however, the bonus amount for Plan B would 
increase by $50 up to a $300 bonus amount.  
In Table 2, we find that, in aggregate, 14.4 percent would take a $50 bonus with 
an implied PPR of four, 45.4 percent would take a $100 bonus with an implied PPR of 
two, 52 percent take a $150 bonus with an implied PPR of 1.3, 64.7 percent would take a 
$200 bonus with an implied PPR of one, 68.6 percent would take a $250 bonus with an 
implied PPR of 0.8, and 79.7 percent of the recruiters would take a $300 bonus with an 
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implied PPR of 0.67. Only 20.3 percent would either require the bonus to be greater than 
$300 or would not accept a bonus to switch to Plan B. 
 
Bonus # of recruiters taking bonus Cumulative percent Implied HQ PPR 
$50 44 14.4% 4.00+ 
$100 95 45.4% 2.00+ 
$150 20 52.0% 1.33+ 
$200 39 64.7% 1.00+ 
$250 12 68.6% 0.80+ 
$300 34 79.7% 0.67+ 
Table 2.   Bonus scenario results 
Based on scenario results, approximately 80 percent of recruiters would take a 
reasonable bonus amount. Furthermore, almost half of recruiters would take a $100 
bonus, with an implied PPR of two HQ contracts, indicating a recruiter bonus would 
likely increase overall productivity by a factor of two when compare to the national PPR. 
As a result, using a bonus simulation may assist in realizing this incentive’s real potential.  
D. BONUS SIMULATION 
The purpose of the bonus simulation is to reveal which bonus amounts would 
have a minimum benefit-cost ratio of 1:1. The following factors were considered in the 
simulation: the bonus amount, proportion taking each bonus, average PPR of non-bonus 
takers, number of recruiters choosing the bonus, number of recruiters not choosing the 
bonus, expected contract for bonus takers, expected contract for non-bonus takers, and 
expected total number of high-quality contract. To ensure conservative estimates, the 
following assumptions were made:  
 NRC annual high-quality requirement of 33,480 contracts 
 A recruiting force of 3250 required to attain annual requirements 
 Recruiters are not demand-constrained and can attain their estimated 
number of contracts 
 No geographic constraints with a reduction of force 
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After running the simulation, results indicate that $50 and $100 bonus amounts 
would meet the requirements to reduce the force and meet annual requirements. 
Therefore, I will use these amounts to conduct a benefit-cost analysis.  
E. BONUS BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this benefit-cost analysis is to determine the potential cost savings 
associated with reducing the recruiting force and providing bonuses to recruiters. As 
mentioned in the previous section, bonus amounts of $50 and $100 provide the requisite 
force and number of contracts to meet annual requirements. Additionally, assumptions 
used in the previous section were applied to the analysis. In Table 3, results indicate that 
for a bonus amount of $50 the Navy would be able to reduce its recruiting force by 704 
recruiters. The benefit of this force reduction would be $54.7 million and the cost would 
be $1.7 million, resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of 32 to 1. Furthermore, for a bonus 
amount of $100 the Navy would be able to reduce its recruiting force by 527 recruiters. 
The benefit of this force reduction would be $41.0 million and the cost would be $3.4 
million, resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of 12 to 1. 
 
Bonus Force Reduction Benefit Cost Ratio 
$50 2546 704 $54.7M $1.7M 32:1 
$100 2723 527 $41.0M $3.4M 12:1 
Table 3.   Benefit-cost analysis 
To calculate the annual benefit of each bonus amount I used the following 
equation: 
    SDAPAnnualductionSalaryAverageductionBenefit _*Re_*Re    
To determine average salary, I estimated the average enlisted recruiter to be an E-
5 with six years of service. Therefore, using this estimate, the average enlisted recruiter’s 
annual salary is $72,177 (this total combines pay and all benefits). For annual SDAP, I 
assumed that, on average, recruiters become eligible for SDAP after 90 days onboard, 
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and when distributed over the average 36-month tour the recruiter is eligible for SDAP 11 
out of 12 months annually. Therefore, I multiplied the number of months eligible by 
$450, for a total of $4950. 
To calculate the annual cost of each bonus amount I used the following equation: 
  contractsqualityhighAnnualquiredamountBonusCost ____Re*_   
As determined by the simulation, the bonus amounts are $50 in $100. However, 
the 33,480 required annual high-quality contracts were assumed in the previous section. 
Although the analysis reveals significant benefit-cost ratios, my analysis would be 
inadequate if I did not address the potential issues associated with a recruiter bonus. The 
following section will discuss adverse effects associated with giving recruiters a bonus. 
F. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF A BONUS 
To avoid similar oversights made by the Army, identifying major issues 
associated with recruiter bonuses is essential. In this section, I will discuss three major 
adverse effects of implementing a bonus 1) increased potential for fraud 2) degradation of 
unit cohesion, and 3) reinforcement of societal stigma.  
1. Increased Potential for Fraud 
Fraud occurs when opportunity and lack of oversight coexist. On the subject of 
recruiting, fraud may be the product a recruiter’s sense of being disproportionately 
compensated for their time and efforts. Therefore, to mitigate the risk of potential fraud, 
policy must limit opportunities and enhance incentive oversight.  
2. Degradation of Unit Cohesion 
Normally, within an NRS, genteel competition is a favorable incentive to promote 
recruiter productivity. Despite this competition, recruiters understand that teamwork is 
paramount in achieving the overall mission. Therefore, implementation of a bonus 
incentive may degrade NRS cohesion by sanctioning recruiters to shift their efforts from 
assisting fellow recruiters to attaining additional contracts for money. 
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3. Reinforcement of Societal Stigma 
Through the optics of our society, perhaps as the result of indiscretions, military 
recruiters remain to be seen as “used-car salesman.” Consequently, prospective applicants 
remain skeptical of recruiter intentions. Therefore, implementation of a per-contract 
bonus may exacerbate skepticism; thereby recruiters may become less productive due to 
the amount of time spent featuring the opportunities associated with enlisting.  
Due to these adverse effects, it may be worthwhile to consider other incentives. In 
the following section, I consider liberty an alternative incentive to a bonus.  
G. BONUS ALTERNATIVE 
Liberty may be the most cost effective means of encouraging recruiter 
productivity. Therefore, in response to the adverse effects of a bonus, I will consider 
liberty as a possible alternative.  
To elicit the effects of liberty on recruiter productivity, I asked recruiters how 
productive they would be with no bonus and no days off, with half-day liberty, and full-
day liberty for each net high-quality contract. Note this was under a set of questions on 
assuming SDAP was reduced to $250. Figure 11 illustrates the effects of liberty on 
monthly recruiter productivity. 
 














No liberty Half-day liberty Full-day liberty
Average  
PPR 
Estimated monthly PPR 
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1. No bonus/No liberty 
Figure 11 shows that with no bonus and no liberty the average expected 
productivity would be 0.65. Considering the question presented a reduced SDAP of $250, 
this average is only slightly below the current national average of 0.85.   
2. Half-day Liberty 
The half-day liberty incentive appears to have the greatest marginal effect on 
recruiter productivity. The average expected productivity would be 1.53, which is more 
than double that of no liberty.  
3. Full-day Liberty 
Although an increase in productivity is observed, with an average of 1.69, the 






In essence, the primary objective of this research was to identify the types of 
incentives that motivate recruiters to produce more contracts. Through the administration 
of an incentives survey, Navy recruiters were given the opportunity to express their 
opinions on current incentives and provide understanding on the potential effects of 
implementing a per-contract-bonus.  
B. DISCUSSION 
1. Back of the Envelope Calculations 
After conducting a benefit-cost analysis, results indicate two bonus amounts 
would pay for themselves, $50 and $100. A $50 bonus yields a benefit of $54.7 million 
and a cost of $1.7 million for a benefit-cost ratio of 32 to 1. Moreover, a $50 bonus has 
an implied productivity of four or more contracts per month for those who would take the 
bonus along with a reduced SDAP. Additionally, a $100 bonus yields a benefit 
component of $41 million and a cost component of $3.3 million for a benefit-cost ratio of 
12 to 1. A $100 bonus has an implied productivity of two or more contracts per month for 
those who would take the bonus.  
2. Optimal Bonus Amount 
Of all the bonus amounts offered, only the $50 and $100 bonuses could pay for 
themselves, with each bonus yielding a benefit-cost ratio of 32 to 1 and 12 to 1, 
respectively.  
Although the implied PPR of a $50 bonus for bonus-takers, four net high-quality 
contracts per month, is twice that of the implied PPR of a $100 bonus, only 14 percent of 
recruiters would prefer the $50 bonus amount. In comparison, nearly 50 percent of 
recruiters would prefer the $100 bonus. Moreover, the bonus generates an implied PPR, 
two high-quality contracts per month, which is two and a half times greater than the 
average national PPR. 
 36 
3. Issues with the Analysis  
Due to the use of scenarios to extrapolate recruiter productivity, recruiters may 
exaggerate their estimates based on the bonus amount. Furthermore, scenarios may be 
seen as having no potential for implementation (i.e., $500 bonus per contract); therefore 
recruiter may have an incentive to overstate their productivity.  
4. Bonus Drawbacks 
Although results reveal favorable benefit-cost ratios, the following drawbacks 
compromise the successful implementation of a per-contract bonus: increase in fraud, 
degradation of unit cohesion, and reinforcement of “used-car salesman” stigma.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the survey results, I recommend the following: 
1. Investigate Bonus Potential  
Investigate methods to mitigate the potential for fraud and the other bonus 
drawbacks to increase the likelihood that this cost-saving incentive could be 
implemented.  
2. Field a “Liberty” Experiment 
Implementation of an official Liberty policy could be done at no additional 
monetary cost. Therefore, conducting this experiment would provide an opportunity to 
gather empirical evidence of Liberty’s effect on recruiter productivity to assist in the 
development of incentive policy. 
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APPENDIX A. INITIAL SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Recruiter Incentive Survey 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! This survey is designed to 
help our team better understand how monetary and non-monetary incentives affect a 
recruiter's motivation to attain their monthly goal (productivity). Additionally, we would 
like to identify individual-level attitudes and perceptions of current incentives and 
productivity levels. Keep in mind, your opinion may assist in the development of new 
Navy Recruiting Command incentive policies. 
 
Your responses will be assigned a random ID and all responses will remain completely 
anonymous. There is no individual benefit or compensation for your participation, 
although results will be used to enhance our research. This survey should take between 5-
10 minutes to complete. 
 
If you have questions or comments about the research please contact LT Luis Ortiz at 
lnortiz@nps.edu, Dr. Jeremy Arkes at jaarkes@nps.edu, or Dr. Jesse Cunha at 
jcunha@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please contact the Naval Postgraduate School Internal Review Board Chairman, Dr. 
Lawrence G. Shattuck at lgshattu@nps.edu, 831-656-2473. 
 
Participation Consent 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are free to stop the 
survey anytime without penalty. Your responses to the survey will be used responsibly 
and protected from release to persons not part of the research; however, as with all data 
collected from any research, there is a minor risk that data could be mismanaged. 
Responses collected will be stored securely on password protected computers at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
Do you wish to volunteer for this survey? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
Section 1 (General Information) 
 
1. Which category below best describes your current position: 
a. Enlisted recruiter 
b. Officer recruiter 
c. Leading Petty Officer 
d. Leading Chief Petty Officer 
e. Division Leading Chief Petty Officer 
f. Head Quarters Management 
g. None of the above 
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7. How many months have you been on recruiting duty?  
 
8. What is your best guess for how many contracts you have written in the last [3,6,12 
depends on participants number of months on recruiting duty] months?  
 
9. Assuming your production was limited by Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) quality 
standards, how many contracts could you have written in the last [3,6,12 depends on 
participants number of months on recruiting duty] if you were NOT restricted in how 
many contracts you could have written? 
 
10.  Approximately, what percentage of your contracts have been high-quality 
(AFQT>=50)?  
 








Section 2 (Non-Monetary Incentives) 
 
Please provide your opinion on command awards and their impact on recruiter 
productivity. 
 
1.) How often do the following awards motivate you (replace “you” with “recruiters” if 
question #1 not equal to “enlisted recruiter”) to obtain more than one contract per 
month? 
  
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Almost 
always 
a. Gold Wreath      
b. Special Liberty      
c. Other Individual 
Awards 
     
d. Station-Level Awards      
e. District-Level Awards      
 
2.) How often do the following awards cause you (replace “you” with “recruiters” if 
question #1 not equal to “enlisted recruiter”) to shift your efforts from recruiting 
high-quality (AFQT>=50) to low-quality (AFQT<50) recruits? 
  
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Almost 
always 
a. Gold Wreath      
b. Special Liberty      
c. Other Individual 
Awards 
     
d. Station-Level 
Awards 
     
e. District-Level 
Awards 
     
 
Section 3 (Bonus Scenario)  
  
*** Please note the following key term: Net high-quality contract - is a monthly contract 
written by a recruiter in which the new enlistee achieves an AFQT score greater than or 
equal to 50, minus any attrites taken in the same month the contract was written. ***  
Suppose the plans described below were the only two Special Duty Assignment Pay 
(SDAP) plans available to recruiter, and each recruiter must make a one-time selection of 
their preferred plan.  
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 Plan A: Receive the current recruiter SDAP of $450 per month, or   
 Plan B: Receive an SDAP of $250 plus a certain bonus for each net high-
quality contract written.  
 
1.) Which Plan would you prefer if the bonus amount were $50? 
a. Plan A - Receive your current SDAP of $450 per month. 
b. Plan B - Receive an SDAP of $250 per month plus a bonus per NET high-
quality contract 
 
2.) Would you prefer Plan B if the “bonus” were $100 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #2. 
3.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $150 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #3. 
4.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $200 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #4. 
5.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $250 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity question, 
if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #5. 
6.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $300 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity question, 
if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #6. 
7.) Enter the minimum amount it would take for you to select Plan B. 
Once the recruiter enters the amount the survey will proceed to a productivity question. 
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Section 4 (Estimated Productivity) 
*** Please note the following key term:  Net high-quality contract - a monthly contract 
written by a recruiter in which the new enlistee achieves an AFQT score greater than or 
equal to 50, minus any attrites taken in the same month the contract was written. *** 
Now imagine Plan B, from the previous question, has replaced the current SDAP 
($450/month). ***Plan B - Receive an SDAP of $250 per month plus a certain bonus for 
each net high-quality contract.***   
Assuming you will remain “on production” for the next 12 months, please estimate the 
total number of net high-quality contracts you would realistically write in that 12 month 
period, if you were not limited in how many you could write, for the following bonus 
amounts: *** Please keep in mind that we are looking for the “net total” number 
of contracts you estimate to write in this 12 month period for each bonus amount *** 
Bonus per high-
quality contract 











Section 5 (Current SDAP) 
 
1.) Considering the environment of recruiting duty, the current SDAP:  
a. Undercompensates recruiters 
b. Correctly Compensates recruiters 
c. Overcompensates recruiters 
2.) A larger SDAP would motivate recruiters to write more contracts.  




e. Strongly Agree 
3.) A “basic” qualified recruiter should receive a lower SDAP than an “advanced” 
qualified recruiter.  
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e. Strongly Agree 
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APPENDIX B. REVISED SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Revision in red font 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! This survey is designed to help 
our team better understand how monetary and non-monetary incentives affect a recruiter's 
motivation to attain their monthly goal (productivity). Additionally, we would like to 
identify individual-level attitudes and perceptions of current incentives and productivity 
levels. Keep in mind, your opinion may assist in the development of new Navy 
Recruiting Command incentive policies. 
Your responses will be assigned a random ID and all responses will remain completely 
anonymous. 
There is no individual benefit or compensation for your participation, although results 
will be used to enhance our research. 
This survey should take between 5-10 minutes to complete. 
If you have questions or comments about the research please contact LT Luis Ortiz at 
lnortiz@nps.edu, Dr. Jeremy Arkes at jaarkes@nps.edu, or Dr. Jesse Cunha at 
jcunha@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please contact the Naval Postgraduate School Internal Review Board Chairman, Dr. 
Lawrence G. Shattuck at lgshattu@nps.edu, 831-656-2473. 
Participation Consent 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you are free to stop the 
survey anytime without penalty. Your responses to the survey will be used responsibly 
and protected from release to persons not part of the research; however, as with all data 
collected from any research, there is a minor risk that data could be mismanaged. 
Responses collected will be stored securely on password protected computers at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 




Section 1 (General Information) 
1. Which category below best describes your current position: 
a. Enlisted Recruiter 
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b. Officer Recruiter 
c. Leading Petty Officer 
d. Leading Chief Petty Officer 
e. Division Leading Chief Petty Officer 
f. Head Quarters Management 
g. None of the above 
 





3. Did you volunteer for recruiting duty? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
4. Were you given a choice about where you would be stationed? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
5. Did you receive your desired NRD (that is, the wide-geographic area)?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
6. Were you assigned to your desired recruiting station within the NRD? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
7. How many months have you been on recruiting duty?  
 
8. What is your best guess for how many contracts you have written in the last [3,6,12 
depends on participants number of months on recruiting duty] months?  
 
9. Assuming your production was limited by Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) quality 
standards, how many contracts could you have written in the last [3,6,12 depends on 
participants number of months on recruiting duty] if you were NOT restricted in how 
many contracts you could have written? 
 
10.  Approximately, what percentage of your contracts have been high-quality 
(AFQT>=50)?  
 




Section 2 (Non-Monetary Incentives) 
 Please provide your opinion on Command awards and their impact on recruiter 
productivity. 
1.) How often do the following awards motivate you (replace “you” with “recruiters” if 
question #1 not equal to “enlisted recruiter”) to obtain more than one contract per 
month? 
  
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Almost 
always 
a. Gold Wreath      
b. Special Liberty      
c. Other Individual 
Awards 
     
d. Station-Level 
Awards 
     
e. District-Level 
Awards 
     
 
2.) How often do the following awards cause you (replace “you” with “recruiters” if 
question #1 not equal to “enlisted recruiter”) to shift your efforts from recruiting 
high-quality (AFQT>=50) to low-quality (AFQT<50) recruits? 
  
Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Almost 
always 
a. Gold Wreath      
b. Special Liberty      
c. Other Individual 
Awards 
     
d. Station-Level 
Awards 
     
e. District-Level 
Awards 
     
 
Section 3 (Bonus Scenario)    
*** Please note the following key term:   Net high-quality contract - is a monthly contract 
written by a recruiter in which the new enlistee achieves an AFQT score greater than or 
equal to 50, minus any attrites taken in the same month the contract was written.  ***   
Suppose the plans described below were the only two Special Duty Assignment Pay 
(SDAP) plans available to recruiter, and each recruiter must make a one-time selection of 
their preferred plan.   
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Plan A: Receive the current recruiter SDAP of $450 per month, or    
Plan B: Receive an SDAP of $250 plus a certain bonus for each net high-quality contract 
written.   
3.) Which Plan would you prefer if the bonus amount were $50? 
a. Plan A - Receive your current SDAP of $450 per month. 
b. Plan B - Receive an SDAP of $250 per month plus a bonus per NET high-
quality contract 
4.) Would you prefer Plan B if the “bonus” were $100 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #2. 
5.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $150 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #3. 
6.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $200 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity 
question, if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #4. 
7.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $250 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity question, 
if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #5. 
8.) Would you prefer option B if the “bonus” were $300 per net high-quality contract? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
If the recruiter’s answer is “Yes” then the survey will proceed to a productivity question, 
if their answer is “No” then proceed to question #6. 
9.) Enter the minimum amount it would take for you to select Plan B. 
$              per contract 
Once the recruiter enters the amount the survey will proceed to a productivity question. 
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Section 4 (Estimated Productivity) 
*** Please note the following key term:   Net high-quality contract - a monthly contract 
written by a recruiter in which the new enlistee achieves an AFQT score greater than or 
equal to 50, minus any attrites taken in the same month the contract was written. *** 
Now imagine Plan B, from the previous question, has replaced the current SDAP 
($450/month).     
***Plan B - Receive an SDAP of $250 per month plus a certain bonus for each net high-
quality contract.***    
Assuming you will remain "on production" for the next 12 months, please estimate the 
total number of net high-quality contracts you would realistically write in that 12 month 
period, if you were not limited in how many you could write, for the following bonus 
amounts:    
*** Please keep in mind that we are looking for the "net total" number of contracts you 
















2) How many net high-quality contracts would you expect to write in that 12 month 
period, provided you are not limited in how many you could write, if you received half a 
day off (Mon-Fri) instead of a bonus for each net high-quality contract? 
 
3) How many net high-quality contracts would you expect to write in that 12 month 
period, provided you are not limited in how many you could write, if you received a full 
day off (Mon-Fri) instead of a bonus for each net high-quality contract? 
  
Section 5 (Current SDAP) 
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1.) Considering the environment of recruiting duty, the current SDAP:  
d. Undercompensates recruiters 
e. Correctly Compensates recruiters 
f. Overcompensates recruiters 
2.) A larger SDAP would motivate recruiters to write more contracts.  




j. Strongly Agree 
3.) A "basic" qualified recruiter should receive a lower SDAP than an "advanced" 
qualified recruiter.  
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